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COMPREHENSIVE HANDGUN LICENSING
& REGISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS &
CRITIQUE OF BRADY II, GUN CONTROL'S
NEXT (AND LAST?) STEP
JAMES B. JACOBS AND IMBERLY A. POTTY'"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,' which be-
came effective in 1994, imposed a background check on pro-
spective handgun purchasers who seek to buy handguns from
federal firearm licensees (FFLs). While the handgun control
groups that lobbied for the Brady law have labeled it a success,
they are also pushing a supplementary omnibus bill that would
create a comprehensive handgun licensing and registration sys-
tem, in effect, extending Brady to the secondary market of
handgun transfers between non-dealers.2 This Article analyzes
the constitutionality and feasibility of this bill's comprehensive
handgun licensing and registration provisions.
Part II describes the main features of Brady Wl.3 Part III ar-
gues that Brady II would be unconstitutional under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Printz v. United States, which struck
down Brady I's requirement that state or local officials carry out
background checks of prospective handgun purchasers.4 Parts
. Professor of Law and Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New
York University School of Law.
.. Senior Research Fellow, Center for Crime and Justice, New York University
School of Law.
' 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)-(t) (1994).
'Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 1321, 104th Cong.;
S. 631, 104th Cong.
'While Brady II covers everything from licensing and registration to monthly lim-
its on handgun purchases to FFL tort liability for victims of gun violence, the scope of
this article is limited to Brady H's licensing and registration provisions.
4 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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IV and V demonstrate the practical difficulties that would be-
devil comprehensive handgun licensing and registration.
II. BRADY II'S REGUiATORYVISION
In 1995, Congressman Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Sena-
tors Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and Charles Lautenburg (D-NJ) intro-
duced the Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act of
19955 (Brady II). It would require all handgun purchasers to
obtain a state handgun permit; states with no handgun permit
laws would have to enact them. Brady II also requires that
handguns be registered before being transferred. Brady II sig-
nificantly expands Brady I by making it illegal "for any person to
sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer a handgun to an individual
who is not [an FFL] unless the transferor... verifie [s] that the
'H.R. 1321, 104th Cong.; S. 631, 104th Cong.
6 Many of the provisions in Brady II were based on previous proposals introduced
into Congress in recent years. Multiple Handgun Transfer Prohibition Act of 1995,
H.R. 964, 104th Cong. (proposing limit on purchase of handguns to no more than
two per month); Handgun Registration Act of 1995, H.R. 169, 104th Cong. (propos-
ing state and federal handgun registration system); H.R. 711, 103d Cong. (proposing
handgun licensing system); Multiple Handgun Transfer Prohibition Act of 1993, H.R.
544, 103d Cong. (proposing limit on purchase of handguns to no more than two per
month).
Brady II was first introduced before Congress on March 1994 as the Gun Violence
Prevention Act of 1994. H.R. 3932, 103d Cong.; S. 1882, 103 Cong. Its provisions are
nearly identical to the 1995 version. In addition to a licensing and registration sys-
tem, the Gun Violence Prevention Act contained provisions for: (1) a seven-day wait-
ing period; (2) making it a crime to store or leave a firearm any place where an
"unsupervised juvenile" is likely to gain access to firearms, and requiring FFLs to post
warning signs to that effect; (3) prohibiting an individual (other than FFLs or those
who hold arsenal licenses) from possessing more than 20 firearms or more than 1,000
rounds of ammunition; (4) repealing provisions for restoration of firearm posses-
sion/purchase privileges under certain circumstances; and (5) limiting handgun pur-
chases to one per month. The Act also provided for more stringent regulation of
FFITs by increasing the license fee, making compliance with state and local law a con-
dition precedent to obtaining a license, authorizing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
& Firearms (ATF) to inspect records three time per year, requiring FFL employees to
be at least eighteen-years-old, obtain a handgun license and undergo a background
check. Further, FFLs are prohibited from transferring a firearm at any location other
than the one specified on the license, and must report lost/stolen firearms within 24
hours after discovery. Additionally, the Act expands the class of "prohibited weap-
ons," increases the tax on handguns and handgun ammunition, and prohibits the
import or manufacture of any firearm that is not child-proofed.
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transferee possesses a valid State handgun license. '7  It also
makes it unlawful for anyone, other than an FFL, to receive a
handgun or handgun ammunition "unless the individual pos-
sesses a valid State handgun license."" The proposed law would
prohibit, not only sales by an FFL to an unlicensed purchaser,
but handgun sales in the secondary market between private citi-
zens, as well as non-commercial handgun transfers between
friends or family members.9
Brady II does not leave it entirely up to states to determine
the requirements for obtaining a state handgun license. The
state handgun license must "at a minimum, meet the following
requirements:" (1) licenses shall be issued by the state's chief
law enforcement officer (CLEO); (2) they shall contain the li-
censee's name, address, date of birth, physical description, and
a photograph; and (3) licenses shall be valid for a period not to
exceed two years.10 Before granting a state license, the CLEO
must verify that: (1) the applicant is at least twenty-one years
old; (2) the applicant is a resident of the state (the applicant
must present an identification document, such as a driver's li-
cense, and a document establishing residency, such as a utility
bill or lease); (3) the applicant is not "prohibited from possess-
ing or purchasing a handgun under federal, state, or local law
based upon name and fingerprint-based research" in federal
and state record systems; and (4) the applicant must have been
issued a State handgun safety certificate."
7 H.R. 1521, § 101 (y) (1) (emphasis added).
'Id. at §101 (y) (5).
Although Brady II envisions a new regulatory scheme, its ultimate goal is the
same as that embodied in the Gun Control Act of 1968, which set forth categories of
persons prohibited from possessing handguns, and Brady I-preventing gun violence
by keeping guns out of the wrong hands. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (1994). Transfer of firearms to or possession by the following persons is pro-
hibited: (1) anyone under felony indictment or convicted of a felony; (2) fugitives
from justice; (3) unlawful users or drug addicts; (4) illegal aliens; (5) dishonorable
dischargees from military; (6) anyone who renounced U.S. citizenship; (7) anyone
subject to restraining order for domestic violence; and (8) anyone convicted of mis-
demeanor domestic violence. Id.
," H.R. 1521, §101(y) (5) (A).
" Id. at §101 (y) (5) (B). A State handgun safety certificate may be issued to resi-
dents who have completed "a course of not less than two hours of instruction in
handgun safety, that was taught by law enforcement officers and designed by the
1998]
JACOBS & POTTER
In proposing Brady II, Congressman Schumer argued that a
comprehensive handgun licensing and registration scheme for
all handgun owners is needed to complete the regulatory
framework started by Brady 1.12 Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI),
the citizens' organization that drafted Brady II, stated that
"[Il]icensing of handgun purchasers allows more thorough
background checks to be conducted on gun buyers and would
help expose gun traffickers by allowing for more accurate trac-
ing of guns found at crime scenes.... Enacting these laws is no
longer a choice; it is a necessity." "
According to HCI's former executive director, Richard
Aborn, HCI decided to switch from an incremental one-step-at-
a-time strategy to achieve effective gun control to a comprehen-
sive approach that puts forward the organization's full agenda
in one proposal.14 HCI felt that a comprehensive approach is
the only way to have a significant impact on reducing gun vio-
lence. According to Aborn, other legislative issues, for example,
health care, social security, and the environment, are not dealt
with in such an incremental fashion; 'You have the Clean Air
Act, not the Clean Air Act only over New York State."'5 Addi-
tionally, HCI wanted to respond to accusations by the National
Rifle Association that HCI had a "secret plan" to ban all firearms
and that each new piece of gun control legislation was a step in
that direction. Aborn stated, 'We wanted to put all our cards on
the table."16
[CLEO]; and has passed an examination, designed by the [CLEO], testing the appli-
cant's knowledge of handgun safety." Id. at §101 (y) (7) (B).
1 Tom Diemer, Gun Control Group Calls for Licensing All Handguns, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Dec. 9, 1993, at Al.
'3 Sarah Brady, Re: Our Country's Claim to Shame: United Nations Study Finds U.S. is a
Leading Source of Firearms for International Gun Smugglers, PREss RELEAsE (Handgun
Control, Inc., Washington, D.C.), May 5, 1997, at 1, 2.
" Telephone Interview with Richard Aborn (Feb. 19, 1998). HCI, unlike the Coa-
lition to Ban Handguns, does not seek the prohibition of private ownership of hand-






The Supreme Court's decision in Printz v. United States
7
makes the constitutionality of Brady II as currently drafted very
doubtful. In Printz, chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) in
Arizona and Montana challenged the Brady I requirement that
state law enforcement officials conduct background checks of
prospective handgun purchasers.8 In declaring Brady I's use of
CLEOs to conduct background checks unconstitutional, the
Court stated that "[tihe federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
The mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform back-
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs
afoul of that rule."19 The Court reasoned that the Framers re-
jected the concept of a central government that would act upon
and through the states, and instead designed a system in which
the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent
authority over the people.
The Constitution's structure reveals a principle that controls
these cases: the system of "dual sovereignty."
Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Fed-
eral Government, they retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty"
[that] is reflected throughout the Constitution's text .... Residual state
sovereignty was also implicit . .. in the Constitution's conferral upon
Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discreet, enumerated
ones, which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amend-
ment's assertion that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."0
17 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
'a Brady's five day waiting period applied only to those states which did not have ei-
ther an "instant check" system for conducting background checks or a state license or
permit requirement for handgun purchases. Twenty-five states are so-called "Brady
states," while twenty-seven states have an instant check system or a licensing scheme.
BUREAU OF JUsTcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PROCEDURES
REiATED TO FIREARM SALES 1996, Appendix Table 2, at 64 (1997).
" Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (citations omitted). The use of CLEOs to conduct
background checks is a temporary measure until the National Instant Background
Check System becomes effective, at which point FFLs will conduct checks via com-
puter or telephone. 18 U.S.C. § (t) (1) (1994).
"1 Pintz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
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Further, the Court rejected the claim that the Brady Act was
constitutional pursuant to Congress' power to enact all laws
necessary and proper to carrying out its gun control objectives
under the Commerce Clause. The Court held that when a law
purporting to regulate commerce "violates the principle of state
sovereignty... , it is not a 'Law... proper for carrying into
Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus merely an act of
usurpation.' Justice Scalia stated:
Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regula-
tory program... [nor may it] circumvent that prohibition by conscript-
ing the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.22
The decision, of course, left it open to CLEOs to voluntarily
continue conducting background checks. Following Printz,
ATF issued a press release and letter to all FFLs explaining that
they were still required to: (1) have potential purchasers fill out
the Brady Form; (2) forward the Brady Form to the CLEO (who
may conduct a voluntary background check); and (3) hold up
sale of the handgun until they receive a green light from the
CLEO or wait five business days, whichever comes first. 2 Never-
theless, Printz dealt a serious blow to the federal government's
ability to enlist state law enforcement personnel to enforce fed-
eral gun control regulations. Brady II, as currently drafted,
would almost certainly be unconstitutional because it violates
the Supreme Court's holding in Printz, that the federal govern-
ment may not commandeer state officials to enforce or adminis-
ter a federal regulatory scheme. Brady II requires much more
action on the part of state officials than Brady I. Under Brady
II, state officials would have to set up and administer a huge li-
" Id. at 2379 (quoting The Federalist No. 33 (A. Hamilton)).
Id. at 2384.
Supreme Court Decision, ATF NEWS (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
Washington, D.C.),June 27, 1997, at 1; John W. Magaw, Open Letter to All Federal Fire-
arms Licensees, LETTER FROM DnEcrOR (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
Washington, D.C.), June 27, 1997, at 1.
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censing system, design curriculum for and conduct handgun
safety classes, issue safety certificates, process the applications of
huge numbers of firearms owners and revoke the registrations
of certain owners.24 The Bill also specifies that a handgun li-
cense would only be good for two years;2 therefore, there would
be a continuous process of reviewing and renewing licenses. In
a post-Printz world, Congress must find some other way to im-
plement this licensing scheme.
Future federal law could try to tie state participation to re-
ceipt of federal funds; in other words, if a state wants federal
money for more police, improved technology and new pro-
grams, then that state must administer and enforce the gun
control regulations specified in the Brady II proposal. Such tac-
tics are not unusual. For example, Congress has made receipt
of federal transportation and highway money contingent on
states passing a twenty-one-year-old minimum drinking age and
laws requiring the wearing of seat belts and the use of in-
fant/child car seats, among others.2 6 The same strategy could
be used to assure state participation in handgun control. This
strategy would be unlikely to succeed, albeit not because of con-
stitutional infirmities. *First, states with strong pro-gun citizen-
ries and lobbies, i.e. the very states that have no state handgun
regulations, would surely choose to forego the federal funds.2
This would be a major, probably fatal problem.8 If even a few
states do not participate, handguns could continue to migrate
from states with relaxed gun laws to states with strict gun con-
" Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 1321, 104th Cong.
§101.
Id. at §101 (y) (5) (A) (iii).
South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2798 (1987).
Today, 15 states require a license for handgun purchases; seven states have both
a handgun licensing system and a registration requirement; registration in three
states is mandated by local ordinance; in Indiana registration is voluntary; and in
Washington, D.C., handgun purchases and possession are prohibited, except by po-
lice officers. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DE1'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE
PROCEDURES RELATED TO FmEARm SALES, 1996, 2 (1997).
, According to a General Accounting Office study, 23 states failed to pass truth-in-
sentencing legislation despite the lure of federal funds. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING




trols. Indeed, the resulting patchwork of control and non-
control states might not look much different than the current
situation in which some states do require handgun and firearm
licenses, while the majority do not. In states with strict gun con-
trols, guns traced by the police often originated from another
state with more permissive gun control laws.
29
Alternatively, federal legislators could go further and create
a federal administrative system of gun control, such as a licensing
and registration system. Such a system would establish a uni-
form national handgun policy that would solve the problem of
handguns flowing from states with permissive gun laws into
states with strict gun laws. On the other hand, it would be legis-
latively complex and expensive to create a federal nationwide
system of handgun licensing and registration.
IV. BRADY II & HANDGUN LICENSING
Supporters of Brady H's licensing scheme frequently stress
that guns should be regulated at least as much as automobiles.
Like cars, guns are dangerous. Cars are not designed to kill,
and yet are heavily regulated: drivers must be of a minimum
age, take a training course, pass a proficiency test, get a license;
obtain insurance, and register the car. Guns carry none of these
restrictions. In the interest of saving lives, Brady II would re-
quire gun owners and manufacturers to adopt safety measures
similar to those required of car owners."
" For example, guns used in crimes in Washington, D.C. were traced to nearby
Virginia which had relatively permissive gun controls. Following passage of a new gun
control measure in Virginia limiting handgun purchases to one per month, Virginia
became a less popular source for Washington, D.C. crime guns. Jon Jeter, Maryland
Tops Virginia as D.C. Gun Supplier, Crime Report Boosts Proposal to Limit Sales, WASH.
POST, JAN. 28, 1996, at Al; Jerry Thomas, Tracking the Georgia Connection, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1990, at Metro 1; Jerry Thomas, Most Guns Bought Outside State,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1989, at Metro 25.
Interestingly, despite Washington D.C.'s ban on handguns, it leads the nation in
the percentage of handgun related homicides-76%. Holly Yeager, Guns in America,
Part 1: Scattershot Statutes, HEAIs NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 24, 1997, available at
<http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/nation/guns/gunpartl.html>.
Handgun Control, Inc., The Gun Violence Prevention Act-Brady II Questions and An-
swers (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://www.handguncontrol.org/about-main.htm>.
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In effect, Brady II seeks to create a drivers' license-like sys-
tem for handgun owners by requiring a license to purchase or
otherwise receive handguns. Brady II establishes a federally
mandated (but state-run) licensing system whereas drivers' li-
censing is state authorized and administered. Brady I regulates
FFLs in an effort to prevent retail sale of handguns to convicted
felons and other ineligibles. Brady II expands the regulatory
reach to cover all non-FFL handgun and handgun ammunition
sellers/transferors and purchasers/transferees*" Brady II does
not require the millions of current handgun owners (approxi-
mately 29% of American households), who currently possess an
estimated eighty to ninety-million handguns, -2 to be licensed un-
less and until they seek to make another handgun purchase or
seek to sell or otherwise transfer a handgun. Prospective sell-
ers/transferors have to verify that the prospective pur-
chaser/transferee has a handgun license, confirm with a CLEO
that the license has not been revoked, and fill out and submit
registration forms documenting the sale or transfer.33
Under Brady II, the licensing scheme would, in effect, pre-
certify the prospective purchaser as an eligible handgun pur-
chaser and she would be able to purchase a handgun from an
FFL upon showing her handgun license and an additional
photo identification document. There would be a type of sec-
ond background check, since the seller would need confirma-
tion from the CLEO that the prospective purchaser's handgun
license has not been revoked.M A person who sells or transfers a
handgun in violation of the Brady II requirements would be
subject to a fine, imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than three years, or both. If a person violates Brady II
with respect to five or more handguns during a thirty day pe-
" In addition, Brady Hl seeks to reduce the number of FFLs selling handguns by:
(1) requiring FFL's to demonstrate that they are meeting "a significant unmet eco-
nomic demand" before they are authorized to deal in handguns; and (2) raising the
business license fee from $200 to $3,000. H.R. 1321, §103., 104th Cong.; S. 631,
104th Cong.
32GARYK.ECy, TARGETING GUNS: EAMSAND THiM CONTROL 97(1997).
Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act of 1995, H.R. 1321, 104th Cong.
§101.
Id. at §101 (y) (5) (A) (iii).
1.998]
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riod, the penalty increases to a fine, imprisonment of not less
than three years, or both. An unlicensed person who receives a
handgun is subject to the same penalties as the seller.8 5 To reit-
erate, however, current handgun owners do not need a license
to continue ownership and possession of their handguns; they
will need a license if they want to sell or transfer their handguns
or purchase additional handguns. 6
The real advance that the Brady II licensing requirement
makes over Brady I is that it seeks to extend the Brady I regula-
tory controls to the secondary market's non-FFL sellers. Under
Brady I, a private individual, not in the business of selling fire-
arms, who wishes to sell or even give her firearm to another in-
dividual could do so by placing an ad in the paper or going to a
gun show and transferring the handgun to any interested pur-
chasers, as long as the seller did not know that the purchaser was ineli-
gible to purchase a handgun.37  This gap in Brady I has been
criticized as a major loophole.8 "The principal shortcoming of
the law is that it does not cover non-dealer transactions, which
probably account for the majority of transfers of guns to crimi-
nals." 9 Under Brady II, it is a crime for a handgun owner to sell
or otherwise transfer a handgun to an unlicensed person.
A. WHAT WILL COMPREHENSIVE LICENSING ACHIEVE?
Like drivers' licensing, Brady II handgun licensing is a
permissive system. Anyone is eligible to obtain a handgun li-
cense as long as she is older than twenty-one and does not fall
within one of the prohibited categories (e.g. felony criminal re-
Id. at §204 (a) (B). Brady U1 does not specify the amount of the fine.
6 Id.
37 It unlawful for anyone (FFLs and private individuals) to sell or transfer a firearm
knowing or having reasonable cause to know that the prospective purchaser is ineli-
gible to possess or purchase a handgun. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1994).
See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, et al. Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1995); James B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the
"Wrong" Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINoLOGY93 (1995).
'9 KLEcK, supra note 32, at 375-76. See Cook et al., supra note 38, at 59.
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cord) .40 This system resembles the drivers' licensing systems in
every state which permit individuals who meet the minimum age
to obtain drivers' licenses after demonstrating minimal driving
skills and knowledge of traffic laws.41 There is no serious at-
tempt ex ante to prevent irresponsible or dangerous people from
obtaining drivers' licenses. There is no background check into
characteristics that may make someone a dangerous driver, such
as immaturity, bad-temperedness, anti-social personality, alcohol
or drug abuse, or mental illness. Ex ante, the drivers' licensing
system weeds out practically no one. The drivers' licensing sys-
tem only has teeth after the driver demonstrates dangerous driv-
ing by violating a serious traffic law. At that point, of course,
injury and even death may already have happened. It is esti-
mated that one in five traffic fatalities are caused by unlicensed
drivers.2 Only after individuals violate the traffic laws are their
licenses suspended or revoked. However, license suspension
and revocation by no means assures the removal of the danger-
ous driver from the road. Does the weak licensing system work?
There are more than 40,000 motor vehicle deaths annually and
hundreds of thousands of serious injuries. 43 In comparison, fa-
talities due to gun accidents (e.g., accidental discharges) num-
44ber approximately 1400-1500 per year.
4' Additional state requirements also have to be satisfied, such as the "restrictive"
(good cause) requirements of a few states like New York. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00
(McKinney 1989); NEwYORK CrrY, N.Y. RULES § 5-02 (1991).
41 However, drivers' licensing statutes may make drug addicts, persons with uncor-
rectable severe vision impairments, or persons with convictions for driving while in-
toxicated ineligible for a driver's license.
4 SeeEmily Sachar, Unlicensed Drivers'Bill Near, NEWSDAY, June 16, 1993, at 7.
0 National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Servs., Unintentional Motor Vehicle Traffic-Related Deaths and Rates Per 100,000 (vis-
itedJan. 24, 1998) < http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/osp/us9592/umvtr.htm>.
" KLEcK, supra note 32 at 32-24 tbl.9.2. According to Gary Kleck, "[p]erhaps the
most widespread myth about gun accidents is that gun accidents primarily involve
children. This is a dangerous misdiagnosis of the problem, which can misdirect con-
trol efforts into ineffective or irrelevant paths." Id at 298. In 1993, 119 children un-
der 13 years old were killed in gun accidents. Many studies report much higher
numbers (for example, 1,000 children die from gunshot wounds). This is because
"child" is defined as anyone between the ages of 0-241 IM at 299.
1998]
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Vast numbers of drivers with suspended and revoked li-
censes continue to drive.45 In New York State alone, approxi-
mately 100,000 persons are convicted of unlicensed operation of
a motor vehicle each year, and this is probably a small propor-
tion of the actual number of people who drive without a valid li-
cense.4 A person arrested for driving without a license is rarely
punished seriously.4 7 Another intractable problem plaguing the
motor vehicle regulatory machinery is the number of uninsured
drivers on the road. It is estimated that uninsured drivers cause
approximately one-eighth of all serious traffic accidents.4 8 Nev-
ertheless, many people believe this is a regulatory system that
works and that ought to be a model for handgun licensing.
Arguably, a handgun licensing system, with its tougher li-
censing requirements, would weed out ineligibles more effec-
tively than the drivers' licensing system. Additionally, Brady II's
federal criminal penalties for possession of a handgun without a
license are much tougher than punishments for driving without
a license and may do a better job of deterrence. However, it is
questionable whether the federal law enforcement system and
federal courts would have the resources, capability, and will to
enforce the law vigorously.49
4'SeeJAMWS B.JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: ANAMERCANDnEMMA 120 (1989).
46See NEWYORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOoK 455 (1994). Even the New York City
government has difficulty keeping dangerous and unlicensed city employees off the
road. According to New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi, 1200 city employees who
drive vehicles in the course of their municipal duties are unlicensed. Further, those
with poor records are permitted to drive on municipal business, including 784 city
employees with drunk driving convictions and 1869 who had two or more accidents.
See Paul Moses, City Lets 1,200 Drive with No License, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at A33.
' In two extreme cases, a New York City driver remained on the road despite 633
license suspensions over the course of five years, and a Long Island, NY driver contin-
ued to drive despite 74 license suspensions in seven years. Both men were arrested
and charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, a felony sub-
ject to a maximum of one and one-third to four years imprisonment See Karen
Freifeld, City's Top Scofflaw Pulled Over, NEwsDAY, Nov. 14, 1994, at A21; Michele Sal-
cedo, 74 Suspensions Land Scofflaw inJail NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 1993, at A27.
" Michael deCourcy Hinds, Uninsured Drivers Create Other Kinds of Wreckage, N.Y.
TIMs, Sept. 3, 1990, atAl.




B. EVADING THE BRADY II LICENSING SYSTEM
A person ineligible for a handgun license could evade the
Brady II licensing system by persuading a gun owner to sell or
"lend" him a handgun or he could use a counterfeit, stolen, or
borrowed license.50 Further, an unlicensed person could use a
licensed "straw man" to purchase the handgun on his behalf, al-
though the straw man's subsequent transfer to the ineligible
person would be illegal. Finally, the unlicensed person could
steal a handgun.
As long as the unlicensed purchaser is never caught with the
handgun, the unlawful sale will go unnoticed.5 ' The risk of de-
tection is negligible. If the unlicensed handgun owner is ar-
rested, he could claim that he did not need a license because he
had owned this handgun before Brady II went into effect. Of
course, if the handgun had been manufactured subsequent to
sAs federal licenses become necessary to purchase handguns from FFJs, phony
handgun licenses will become a hot commodity, just as fake drivers' licenses and
green cards are now. See generally, Implementation ofEmplayer Sanctions: Hearings on H.R.
521 Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1993) (statement of Dan Stein, Ex-
ecutive Director, Federation for American Immigration Reform, noting ready avail-
ability of phony identification documents); Art Barnum, Curbing Fakes: State Targeting
Traffic in Phony Driver's Licenses, CH TRm., Sept. 13, 1993, at DI; William Branigin,
New Law Fails to Stem Row of Mexicans Into California: Loophole May Add to Illegal Cross-
ings, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1988, at A30 (discussing "booming market" in phony iden-
tification papers); Jeffrey Roberts, iD Cards Used to Buy Guns Illegally, DENVER PoST,
Jan. 17, 1994, at Al. Especially in the secondary market, a fake handgun license
could be used to dupe the unsophisticated seller. Alternatively, a fake driver's license
could be used to obtain a valid handgun license, although this is less likely to succeed
because of Brady II's background check requirement which includes a fingerprint-
based search in federal and state records.
" The vast majority of handgun owners do not use their weapons to commit crime.
KLECx, supra note 32, at 71.
" In testimony before Congress, Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division, U.S. Department of'Justice, stated:
[T~he most common way we come across a 922(g) [felon-in-possession] violation is
when the person has committed another crime. It is difficult for law enforcement to
learn about and be able to prosecute a 922(g) without their having committed another
crime because it is very difficult to find them in possession.
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Jus-
tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1994) [hereinafter
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes].
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passage of Brady II, the arrestee could not rely on that tale.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that federal prosecutors will be
eager to bring prosecutions against otherwise law-abiding citi-
zens who failed to comply with Brady H's licensing require-
ments. Currently, federal prosecutors do not eagerly accept for
prosecution felon-in-possession cases unless the felon is a hard-
ened criminal who represents a threat to the public. 3 A study of
cases presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern
District of Illinois found that the prosecution rate for weapons
and explosives offenses was 24%.5  In 1993, U.S. Attorneys' of-
fices nationwide declined to prosecute 27.6% of weapons of-
fenses.5 According to the head of the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, prosecuting every felon-in-possession case
would not be "good law enforcement policy.5 6 In 47% of weap-
ons cases declined for prosecution, the reason provided by the
screening prosecutor was that the case involved a "minor of-
fense."57 Moreover, juries may be unwilling to convict if the de-
fendant's only crime is unlicensed possession of a handgun."
If the unlawful handgun transfer did come to light, the
seller (assuming he could be traced and found) could untruth-
fully claim that he did not realize the gun was missing; had he
realized it, he certainly would have reported it as lost or stolen.59
He could claim that the person to whom he transferred the
handgun did have a valid license and that he did fill out and file
" See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REv. 939, 982-85 (1997).
Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CGi. L. REV. 246, 258 tbl.3 (1980).
5' UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS - 1995, at
465 tbl. 5.16 (1996). The U.S. Attorneys' offices declined to prosecute 30.9% of all
crimes presented.
-1 See Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes, supra note 52, at 50.
'7 See Frase, supra note 54, at 269 tbl.10.
SeeDavid N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness:Jury Nullfi-
cation in aNew Contex4 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 861, 888 (1995). Between 1990 and
1993 in Brooklyn, New York, juries acquitted 56% of all defendants in state gun pos-
session cases. The acquittal rate for all crimes was approximately 35%. Id. at 886-87.
" Brady II requires that within 24 hours after discovery that a handgun has been
stolen or lost, the licensed person shall report the theft or loss to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the CLEO, and local law enforcement. Failure to do so is punishable by a
civil penalty of not less than $1,000. See H.R. 1321, § 101(y) (5) (G) (i)-(ii).
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all the relevant forms; he could also claim to be the victim of a
fraud by the arrested person or of a bureaucratic screw up.
The Brady II licensing system is unlikely to prevent crimi-
nals from obtaining handguns. First, many criminals already
own handguns or have ready access to handguns through a
friend, family member, or a gang associate.6 Many guns are ob-
tained through theft or purchase from drug dealers or addicts. 1
Motivated criminals (who are not deterred by existing criminal
laws) are hardly going to worry about committing the crime of
illegally selling or transferring a handgun.
Since 1968, it has been a federal crime for a person with a
felony record to possess a firearm. 2 Nevertheless, gun owner-
ship levels among convicted felons is higher than among the
general population .6  A 1986 survey sponsored by the National
Institute of Justice found that five out of six gun-owning felons
obtained handguns from the secondary market and by theft,6
and that "[t]he criminal handgun market is overwhelmingly
dominated by informal transactions and theft as mechanisms of
supply."' According to a more recent National Institute of Jus-
tice survey of juvenile felons and inner-city juveniles, conducted
by Joseph F. Sheley and James D. Wright, 54% of the inmates
and 37% of the students indicated they could easily obtain a
handgun "off the street." An even greater percentage reported
that they could get a handgun from a friend or family member
60 See KYEcK, supra note 32, at 86-88. See alsoJEFFREYA. ROTH, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE,
FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 3 (1994); JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMs D. WRIGHT, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, GUN AcQUIsITION AND POSSESSION IN SELECTED JUVENILE SAMPLES 6 (1993);
U.S. DEPT OFJUSTIcE, NAT'L INST. OF JuSTICE, ARRESTEES AND GUNS: MONITORING THE
ILLEGAL FIREARMS MARKET (1995) [hereinafter NIJ, ARRESTEES AND GUNS]; MARIANNE
W. ZAwrrz, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTIcE, GUNS USED IN CRIME (1995).
6 See SHELEy & WRIGHT, supra note 60, at 6; KLEc, supra note 32, at 90-91.
62 See 18 U.S.C-.A § 922(g) (1) (West 1998).
See SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 60, at 6.
JAMES D. WRIGHT, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, THE ARMED CRIMINAL IN AMERICA: A
SURVEY OF INCARCERATED FELONS 2 (1986).
"SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 60, at 6. Sheley and Wright's study focused on ju-
venile felons and inner-city juveniles "because these groups are popularly thought to




(45% of inmates and 53% ofjuveniles).67 The survey found that
the top sources for handguns in order of preference were: (1)
borrowing from a family member or friend (45% of inmates,
53% ofjuveniles); (2) buying a handgun from a family member
or friend (36% of inmates, 35% of juveniles); (3) buying "off
the street" (54% of inmates, 37% ofjuveniles); (4) buying from
a drug dealer or addict (36% of inmates, 22% ofjuveniles); (5)
buying from a gun shop (12% of inmates, 28% of juveniles);
and (6) theft (17% of inmates, 8% of juveniles).6 Eighty-five
percent of inmates owned a gun just prior to their arrest, while
22% ofjuveniles owned a gun at the time of the survey. Inter-
estingly, the authors noted that "focusing on ownership results
in an under-estimation of the number of guns in the hands of
the students in the study.... Among the student sample, carry-
ing a gun at least occasionally was moe common than gun owner-
ship [35% report carrying]."6
Quite possibly, imposing stricter handgun control measures
on the retail market may have minimal impact on preventing
felons and juveniles from obtaining handguns. While the in-
mates and juveniles in Sheley and Wright's survey viewed FFLs
as a potential source for handguns, they also thought it unnec-
essary to resort to retail dealers. Indeed, the informal market
for illegal guns (i.e., family, friends, drug dealers, and addicts)
makes it unlikely that licensing and registration requirements
applicable to the secondary market would have a significant im-
pact. Sheley and Wright concluded that:
Informal commerce in small arms involving purchases and trades among
private parties... is difficult to regulate ... and successfully subverts le-
gal measures designed to prevent guns from falling into the wrong
hands. In the final analysis, the problem may not be that the appropri-
ate laws do not exist but that the laws that do exist apparently are not or
cannot be enforced, and that persons involved in firearms transactions
with juveniles are not concerned with the legality of the transaction.70
6 Id. at 6 tbl.2.
68id.
6Id. at 5.
70 1& at 10.
[Vol. 89
BRADY I
Theft is one of the primary ways that handguns end up in
the hands of criminals. Each year, an estimated 500,000 to 1.4
million firearms are stolen.7' In addition to the eighty million
handguns currently owned, approximately 4.5 million new
handguns are sold each year, thus adding to the stock of hand-
guns available for theft.7 Further, most stolen guns are not ob-
tained as part of an organized large-scale gun trafficking
operation, but in small-scale deals or simply by chance during
the course of committing crimes.73 Some researchers have
found that 40-70% of convicted felons obtained their most re-
cent handgun through theft.74 Other statistics indicate that 47%
of felons had stolen guns at least once, while 32% of felons had
obtained their most recent handgun through theft.75 While
criminals are not necessarily experts in gun theft, and may not
commit a burglary or theft with the goal of obtaining a gun, the
majority of handguns possessed by criminals are stolen, al-
though not necessarily by the current owner.76 According to so-
ciologist Gary Kleck:
Even if one could completely eliminate all voluntary transfers of guns to
criminals, including lawful or unlawful transfers, involving either li-
censed dealers or private citizens, and even if police should completely
confiscate all firearms from all criminals each year, a single year's worth
of gun theft alone would be more than sufficient to rearm all gun crimi-
nals and easily supply the entire set of guns needed to commit the cur-
rent number of gun crimes.
7
C. LICENSING CONCLUSIONS
Brady II seeks to bolster the Gun Control Act of 1968 and
the Brady Handgun Control Act of 1993 by establishing a com-
prehensive handgun and handgun ammunition licensing
71 See Cook et al., supra note 38, at 81.
"2KLEcK, supra note 32, at 87.
" ExcK, supra note 32, at 91; SHELEY & WRIGhiT, supra note 60, at 6.
71JAMES D. WRIGHT Er AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERIcA 193-97 (1983).
7' See WRIGHT, supra note 64, at 2.
76 KLEMC, supra note 32, at 91; SHELEY & WRIGHT, supra note 60, at 6.
KCK, supra note 32, at 92-93.
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scheme that would further the goal of keeping handguns out of
the hands of criminals while leaving everyone else free to own as
many handguns as they like. Even if all ineligible persons could
be prevented from obtaining handguns from FFLs, enforcing a
licensing scheme in the secondary market would require a mas-
sive law enforcement effort. The question is whether we have
the regulatory tools and resources to implement such a policy.
One reason to be pessimistic is the existence of eighty to
ninety million unregistered handguns currently in the posses-
sion of tens of millions of people, including criminals. This vast
number would undoubtedly increase if it ever appeared that
Congress was likely to pass Brady II. A rush to buy handguns be-
fore the licensing system became effective would likely occur,
just as there was a rush to buy handguns before Brady's five-day
waiting period went into effect.78 By the time Brady II went into
effect there would likely be more than one-hundred million
handguns in private hands, tens of thousands of them stock-
piled for future sales when they might fetch a real premium.
Hard core criminals would be little affected by the licensing
system. Moreover, their current possession of firearms puts
them in violation of federal criminal law and, typically, state
criminal law as well. Nevertheless, according to a significant
body of research they have little trouble obtaining handguns.79
Much of their stock comes through stolen guns and through in-
formal transfers from family members, friends, and gang associ-
ates. o The licensing system would have minimal impact on the
criminal gun market.
V. BRADY II's REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Brady II seeks to establish a comprehensive handgun regis-
tration system. This is a completely new policy initiative. Other
78 See Kim Bell, Brady Bill Triggered Jump in Pistol Sales, Police Offiers Say, ST. LouIs
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 1994, at Bi; See also Steve Bates, Gun Shops Get Shot in the Arm,
Brady Bill Fears Said to Spur Surge in Sales, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1993, at B1.
79 wRIGT, ET AL., supra note 74, at 193-97; see generally KLECK, supra note 32; NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, ARRESTEES AND GUNS, supra note 60; ROTH, supra note 60; SHELEY &
WRIGHT, supra note 60; WRiGHT, supra note 64; ZAwrrz, supra note 60; Cook et al., supra




than the federal registration scheme for machine guns that has
existed since 1934, the federal government has never tried to
maintain a firearms registry."' Only eight states have attempted
to maintain handgun registries.82
Nowhere in the Brady II bill do we find the words "national
handgun registry," but this is undoubtedly what the proponents
envision.8 3 Under existing regulations, manufacturers must en-
grave a serial number on the barrel of each handgun. 4 Manu-
facturers, wholesalers, and dealers must maintain records on
handgun sales and supply such information to the Secretary of
the Treasury upon requestss Brady II would supplement the
paper trail on every handgun by requiring every
seller/transferor (after verifying the prospective buyer's hand-
gun license and eligibility) to fill out a registration form. The
form includes the purchaser's handgun license number, name,
8' National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994); 18 U.S.C. 922(o)
(1994) (prohibiting transfer or possession of machine guns); 27 C.F.R. 178.101-105
(1996). As of 1995, there were approximately 240,000 machine guns registered in the
United States. Half of these registered machine guns are owned by police depart-
ments and other governmental agencies; the other half belong to private citizens.
KLEcK, supra note 32, at 108. The Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986 "froze" the
number of machine guns legally possessed by private citizens at the 1986 level. Pub.
L. 99-308 (1986).
' The states with handgun registries are Hawaii (handguns and long guns),
BuREAu oFJuScE STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 11; Indiana (voluntary registration),
id. at 14; Maryland (owner registration not required, but state maintains record of all
sales by FFLs), id. at 20; Massachusetts (handguns), id. at 21; Michigan (handguns),
id. at 22; NewJersey (handguns), id. at 30; New York (handguns), id. at 32; Pennsyl-
vania (owner registration not required, but state maintains record of all sales by
FFLs), id. at 38. In some states, registration is required on a local or county basis: Illi-
nois (required by some local governments), id. at 13; Missouri (required by some lo-
cal governments), id. at 25; Nevada (required only in Clark County (Las Vegas)), id.
at 28.
"For other handgun registration proposals, see, for example, The Handgun Reg-
istration Act of 1995, H.R. 169, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing federal handgun reg-
istration in states that do not have state registration systems). This bill was re-
introduced in 1997 as the Handgun Registration Act of 1997, H.R. 186, 105th Cong.
(1997).
a' 27 C.F.R. 178.123-178.124 (1996); H.R. 1321, § 205 (1995) (proposing that "each
licensed manufacturer shall, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary [of Treasury], maintain records of the ballistics of handgun barrels made by the
licensed manufacturer and of the serial numbers of such barrels and make such rec-
ords available to the secretary.")
" 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1994); 27 C.F.R. 178.121, 178.123, 178.126 (1996).
JACOBS & POTTER
and address; and the handgun's make, model, and serial num-
ber.86 The same procedure must be followed by all subsequent
sellers or transferors.
Brady II requires that "State law provide the CLEO shall
furnish information from completed handgun registration
forms to federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities
upon request. "88 Strangely, Brady II speaks of state handgun
registration systems, but not a national system. A federally-
mandated state-based registration system would be unwieldy and
inefficient, in addition to being unconstitutional. Under such
a system, if a Vermont handgun owner sold his handgun to a
New York State purchaser and never registered the sale, the
handgun could not be traced in New York's system. Of course,
if the New York police sent in a request to ATF, they could trace
the gun (assuming the serial number had not been obliterated)
back to a first sale in Vermont. The New York police could then
contact the Vermont registration system to determine the iden-
tity of the handgun's last registered owner.
Presumably, a post-Printz version of Brady II will require that
all FFLs and private sellers send handgun registration informa-
tion to ATF headquarters in Washington, D.C., where it will be
stored in a database that would, in effect, constitute a national
handgun registry.90 The goal would be to achieve an easily ac-
cessible ownership record for every handgun in the U.S. Since
many owners would not sell their handguns for years, perhaps
decades, it would take a long time for the registry to become
complete. But, when fully mature, the system would look like
H.R. 1321, § 101(6) (1995).
87 H.R. 1321, § 101(6) (C) (1995) (registration forms are to be sent to the CLEO,
who may charge a registration fee).
8H.R. 1321, § 101(6) (B) (1995).
" Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearm Owner's Protection Act which prohibited
retaining firearms transaction records for "any system of registration of firearms, fire-
arms owners, or firearms transactions." 18 U.S.C. 926(a) (3) (1994). Brady II effec-
tively nullifies this law. Section 202 provides that: "The Director of the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms shall centralize all records of receipts and dispositions
of firearms obtained by the Bureau and maintain such records in whatever manner




the registration systems we now have for real property and for
automobiles, except that Brady II would be a federally man-
dated system.91
A. GOAL OF THE HANDGUN REGISTRATION SYSTEM
A national handgun registry would play an important role in
supporting the handgun licensing system, because without reg-
istration it would be nearly impossible to establish a chain of
ownership. Keeping in mind that the underlying goal of Brady
II is to reduce gun violence by keeping guns out of the wrong
hands, registration is a strategy of deterring licensed owners
from selling handguns to ineligibles. Ideally, a registration sys-
tem would enable law enforcement and ATF to keep track of
handgun transfers. Arguably, it would also further law en-
forcement investigations by making it possible to trace guns to
their registered owners, and by providing a paper trail to black
marketeers. It would also make it possible to tax firearms sales
and ownership.
The registration requirements play an important role in fur-
thering the efficacy of the licensing system. Without registra-
tion, it would be very difficult to trace an unlawful sale back to
the seller. Therefore, without comprehensive registration,
many sellers might feel that they could ignore with impunity the
requirement that they only sell handguns to licensed persons.
It is hard to imagine a handgun sale to an ineligible person
coming to light other than after the apprehension and/or arrest
of an unlicensed person in possession of a handgun." Suppose
that the police arrest a criminal suspect who is found to have a
handgun manufactured after the effective date of Brady II. If
the suspect does not have a handgun license, he must have ob-
tained this handgun illegally, but from whom-an unscrupulous
FFL? a casual arm's length seller? a black market gun dealer? a
drug dealer? a criminal comrade? Without a registration sys-
" Given the Supreme Court's decision in Printz v. United States, it seems unlikely
that state maintained registries and CLEO processing of registration forms would be
constitutional.
"Admittedly, a sting operation could also lead to the identification of a person
who sells a handgun (or handguns) to an unlicensed purchaser.
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tem to provide a paper trail on that handgun's history, there
would be no way to figure out who sold or gave the handgun to
the criminal suspect.
With a handgun registration system, the police could
quickly determine the identity of the handgun's last lawful
owner. They could confront (brow beat!) that person, demand-
ing to know how it is that there is no record of the handgun
having been transferred to someone else nor any record of the
handgun having been reported as stolen or lost. Of course, the
registered owner could say he was unaware that he lost it and so
forth, but he would be under some pressure and would be sub-
ject to a civil fine of $1,000 for failure to timely report a lost or
stolen handgun.3
B. SOLVING CRIMES
Would a national handgun registry aid in preventing or
solving crime? If the police recovered a gun left at the crime
scene they could send the serial number to the National Trac-
ing Center which could identify the registered owner.94 The po-
lice would then have a suspect.
This crime-solving potential is diminished by a few facts. If
the gun is recovered at the scene it is usually because the police
have arrested the person attached to it. Conversely, if the sus-
pect gets away, the gun is not recovered. However, suppose the
police do recover a handgun that was used in a crime, but the
perpetrator is unknown. If the registration system were operat-
ing effectively and efficiently, the handgun's owner could be
9' H.R. 1321, Sec. 101 (5) (G). Not later than 24 hours after a handgun licensee
discovers that a handgun has been stolen from or lost by the licensee, the licensee
shall report the theft or loss to: the Secretary [of the Treasury], the chief law en-
forcement officer of the state, and appropriate local authorities. This provision seems
to leave a big loophole for evasion if the owner says he never discovered that the
handgun has been lost or stolen.
" There has been a National Firearms Tracing Center in the ATF since the early
1970's. Thus, it seems strange that Brady II purports to establish just such a center.
In 1996, the National Firearms Tracing Center responded to approximately 130,000
trace requests. The main purpose is to gather intelligence on the origins (manufac-
turers and dealers) of crime guns and thus patterns of interstate migration. The
traces are of very little use in solving individual crimes. See Paul Blackman, The Uses
and Limitations of BATF Tracing Data for Law Enforcement, Policymaking and criminological
Research, 10J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 27, 32-36 (1998).
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identified and the police would have a suspect, i.e. the hand-
gun's registered owner. Assuming that the registered owner
could be located, he might (falsely) claim not to have realized
that the gun had been lost or stolen. Such an admission would
make the registered handgun owner liable for (at least) a $1,000
civil fine for failing to report a lost handgun or for prison time
for failing to abide by the Brady II licensing requirements, but
the police would still have to prove commission of the crime;
success is hardly guaranteed.
The enterprising criminal could also defeat the tracing sys-
tem by obliterating the serial number; this is done with a large
percentage of crime guns.95 If he then dropped the gun at the
scene of the crime, it could not be traced. It remains to be seen
whether the Secretary of the Treasury could come up with a
fool-proof scheme for marking guns with serial numbers.9
C. IDENTIFING BLACK MARKETEERS
Currently, ATF's National Firearms Tracing Center is most
useful in gathering intelligence about the origins and interstate
migration of crime guns, not in providing information that
helps to solve individual gun crimes.9  The weapons traces
might be useful in identifying certain types of guns used dispro-
"' Serial numbers are relatively easy to remove by using a file. Sheley and Wright
reported that the top three handgun traits cited by juvenile inmates were firepower,
quality of construction, and untraceability. SHELEY & W1UGHT, supra note 60, at 5.
ATF acknowledges that trace guns are not representative of crime guns because rela-
tively few guns recovered by police at crime scenes are submitted for tracing; indeed,
many of the guns submitted for tracing were not used in a crime at all, but simply
"found" by police. An estimated 20% of guns submitted to ATF for tracing were un-
traceable because the serial number was obliterated. David M. Kennedy, et al., Youth
V olence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 L.
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., 147, 174 (1996).
New technologies, such as a computer chip containing a serial number, could be
developed that might make it impossible to obliterate "the gun's serial number or
identity." Further, a serial number could be placed inside the barrel of the gun, as
well as on the outside, making it more difficult to obliterate. Of course that would
only effect the non-obliterability of guns produced once those new technologies
come on line. The approximately 90 million handguns already in existence are vul-
nerable to serial number obliteration.
7 Memorandum from Raymond F. Kelley, Under Secretary (Enforcement), to
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Part HI (Feb. 3,
1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum].
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portionately in crimes, certain manufacturers, or FFLs whose
guns are disproportionately used in crime. This can be done, of
course, without any elaboration of the current regulatory sys-
tem. Unless the serial number has been obliterated, under ex-
isting laws and regulations, a firearm can be traced back to its
manufacturer and from the manufacturer to the wholesaler and
FFL retailer. If the FEL keeps its records properly and in con-
formity to law, the gun can be traced to its first individual
owner. The current records system runs out after that point,
and that is where Brady II would pick up.
Handguns get from the legitimate market into the hands of
criminals through thefts, purchases in the secondary market,
loans and gifts from family members, friends, and criminal
comrades. There are some number of corrupt FFLs who spe-
cialize in selling handguns directly to criminals or in selling
them to traffickers who, in turn, sell them to criminals." ATF
reported that in 1996, about 60% of successfully traced crime
guns originated with 1% of all FFLs. Further, 5% of gun traf-
ficking prosecutions were against FFLs.9 Currently, weapons
traces can be useful in identifying corrupt FFLs. During the
mid-1990s, ATF joined with a number of state and local police
departments to identify corrupt dealers, close them down and
prosecute them. ATF's "Project Detroit" operation, in which
guns confiscated by Detroit police from 1989 to 1990 were
traced back to FFLs, resulted in criminal investigations of thir-
teen dealers and successful prosecutions against ten dealers. 1°°
ATF estimated that these dealers supplied over 3,000 firearms to
black-marketeers.101 ATF has since continued its efforts to crack
down on corrupt FFLs and black-marketeers through Project
LEAD, an automated program that assembles information from
gun traces and multiple purchase forms submitted by FFLs. °2 In
1996, ATF recommended 2,230 trafficking defendants for
Id. at Part IV.
" Erik Larson, The Story of a Gun, ATLAN-rc MoNTHLY, Jan. 1993, at 68.
101 Id
"2 FFLs are required to report to ATF all multiple sales of two or more handguns




prosecution, including many FFLs. It is hard to see how Brady
II would significantly improve the investigation of black market-
eers and gun runners.
D. EVADING THE REGRATION SYSTEM
The biggest impediment to a national handgun registry is
the number of unregistered handguns already in circulation. In
a world with very few handguns in private hands, one might be
optimistic about the success of a handgun registration system.
In the United States at the present time there are approximately
eighty to ninety million handguns in private hands and 4.5 mil-
lion new guns adding to that stock each year. l  Undoubtedly, if
and when a national handgun registration system began to look
like a serious political possibility, there would be a tremendous
increase in the sale of handguns in the period before the law
was passed and went into effect.'05 Thus, it is probably conserva-
tive to assume that by the time a handgun registration system
came on line, there would be at least one-hundred million un-
registered handguns in private hands. The registration of these
one-hundred million handguns would present a monumental
task.
Brady II does not require the registration of handguns until
the owner decides to sell or otherwise transfer her handgun to
another person. Thus, even if compliance of post-Brady II
handgun transfers were high, it would take decades for the ex-
isting stock of handguns to be registered. But will the rates of
compliance be high? Given the hostility of many gun owners to
registration and their belief that a registration system would
subsequently be used to confiscate all handguns, (as recently
105 Memorandum, supra note 97.
, Kiiyc, supra note 32, at 87.
105 See, e.g., Kim Bell, Brady Bill Triggered Jump in Pistol Sales, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan 18. 1994, at B1 (citing rise in handgun sales attributable to Brady Law);
Steve Bates & Santiago O'Donnell, Gun Shops Get Shot in the Arm, WASH. POST, Nov. 27,
1993, at B1 (same); Charlie Brennan, Coloradans Go for Their Guns, RocKy MOUNTAiN
NEWS (Denver), Feb 20, 1994, at A6 (citing rise in handgun sales attributable to Brady
Law; Scott Shane, Curbs on Guns Are Growing, But So Are Sales, BALTIMORE SUN, May 15,
1994, at Al (citing rise in handgun sales attributable to Brady law).
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happened in Britain), °6 there would be a great deal of non-
compliance. Indeed, if a current handgun owner decided to
sell and wanted to avoid the registration requirement, he could
easily find a buyer of like mind, and so on down the line. A sin-
gle handgun could be sold.again and again without being regis-
tered and with little chance of detection.
In recent years, several states and municipalities passed laws
mandating the registration of assault rifles. These laws failed
miserably, primarily due to owner resistance. In Boston and
Cleveland, the rate of compliance with the ban on assault rifles
is estimated at 1%. 107 In California, nearly 90% of the approxi-
mately 300,000 assault weapons owners did not register their
weapons."" Out of the 100,000-300,000 assault rifles estimated
to be in private hands in New Jersey, 947 were registered, an
additional 888 were rendered inoperable, and four were turned
over to the authorities. 109
Since 1911, Massachusetts has required the registration of
handguns purchased in the primary market.110 Since 1968, it
has required the registration of all handguns.' Indeed, Brady
II looks a lot like the Massachusetts system of licensing and reg-
istration. To date, there has not been a thorough evaluation of
Massachusetts registration system, but it appears that no more
than 10% of secondary market handgun sales are recorded.1
2
The administrative agency in charge of the registration system
has been chronically understaffed and short of resources." As
of March, 1996, there were approximately 750,000 unentered
"6 Firearms (Amendment) Act of 1997, Curr. L. Stats., Vol. 1 (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1997).
1
07 DAvI B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA
ADOPTTHE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES 231, n.210 (1992).
108 Id.
"1 David B. Kopel and Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and
Guns: Assessing the Case For Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REv. 438, at 459.
"o MASS. GEN LAwsANN., ch. 140, § 123 (West 1995).
"' MASS. GEN LAwSANN., ch. 140, § 128A (West 1995).
12 Caleb Pollack, Massachusetts Gun Laws and a National Solution to Gun Control





sales transactions dating back to 1985 when the agency ceased
maintaining a computer data base. 4
It needs emphasizing that even if a significant percentage of
law-abiding handgun owners complied with the registration law,
we can be certain that handgun-owning criminals would not
comply. There are already large numbers of handguns in circu-
lation in the criminal subculture. A criminal could use the same
unregistered gun throughout his career and, when he retired,
sell or give it to a relative, friend, or criminal associate. There-
fore, the impact on the availability of handguns in the criminal
subculture of even a well-functioning registration system might
not be evident for decades.
Would young criminals who did not have handguns before
passage of Brady II find it difficult to obtain unregistered hand-
guns? Some criminals claim that it is as easy to buy a gun on the
streets as it is to buy fast food. s The 500,000 firearms that are
stolen each year will provide an enormous pool of handguns
that cannot be traced to their new possessors. Rifles and shot-
guns that are cut down to the length of handguns could not be
traced because they are not subject to registration. Criminals
might also be able to purchase unmarked handguns that are
smuggled into the country from abroad. Some number of
never-registered handguns will, of course, continue to be sold by
gun dealers, drug dealers, and gun owners hostile to the whole
idea of handgun registration.
If non-compliance is substantial, the value of the registra-
tion system would be seriously undermined. Compliance would
depend, to a large extent, on gun owners' voluntary decision to
register. While Brady II calls for imprisonment of not less than
six months or more than three years for gun owners who trans-
fer their firearms without filing the appropriate registration
forms, U.S. Attorneys will probably be less than eager to prose-
cute otherwise law abiding gun owners who have failed to regis-
114 id.
.. One Chicago gang member, indicating the ease with which guns may be ob-
tained, stated, "[ilt's like going through the drive-through window. 'Give me some
fries, a Coke, and a 9-millimeter.'" Don Terry, How Criminals Get Their Guns: In Short,
All To Easily, N.Y. TIMEs, March 11, 1992, at Al.
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ter their handguns., We can anticipate that in several states
(those where compliance is lowest), such actions would prove
very unpopular with jurors.
E. REGISTRATION CONCLUSIONS
Handgun control advocates envision a registration system
that would resemble automobile registration. Every automobile
is registered with the state department of motor vehicles. An
owner cannot get license plates without registering the vehicle.
When the vehicle is sold, the seller must provide the state de-
partment of motor vehicles with the details of the sale and must
turn in his license plates. The new owner must register the ve-
hicle in his name and apply for new license plates.
The system is fairly easy to enforce. Every car must have li-
cense plates. A car without license plates would be easily spot-
ted, stopped, and the driver ticketed; the car would be removed
from the road. What if an owner just sells the car to someone
else and doesn't bother with the forms and with turning in the
license plates? Then the seller would remain the owner of rec-
ord and would be liable for maintaining insurance on the vehi-
cle and for accidents in which the car was involved. Obviously,
the seller would have a strong interest in avoiding this liability.
One rationale for the auto registration system is that it al-
lows the government to tax automobiles efficiently. A second
rationale is that the registration system makes it difficult to steal
cars. The victim of a car theft immediately reports it to the po-
lice. If a police officer sees a car with the license plate of the
stolen Vehicle, he will stop and apprehend the driver; the car
can be returned. Moreover, if the thieves are 'Joyriders" and
abandon the vehicle, the police can easily locate the rightful
owner through the registration system.
Obviously, the deterrent potential of the vehicle registration
system is fairly weak. Over one million autos are reported stolen
every year; many vehicles are never recovered. The thieves
1 See supra notes 58-58 and accompanying text (discussing federal prosecutors'
unwillingness to prosecute felon-in-possession cases and probable reluctance ofjuries
to convict unlicensed defendants).
"'7See generally UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UN= STATES 1996 (1997).
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may put new license plates on the vehicle, bring it to a different
state, or simply bring the stolen vehicle to a "chop shop" where
it is broken down for parts. There is no organized (or disorgan-
ized) movement to resist automobile registration. No one fears
that it is a step toward confiscation.
In contrast to cars, handguns can last for one-hundred years
or more and a handgun registration system will have to be
launched when there are already nearly one-hundred million
unregistered handguns in private hands. This would be a
daunting regulatory challenge and policy makers ought to think
carefully before undertaking it. Moreover, there can be no
doubt that handgun registration would be strongly and mas-
sively resisted because of the fear that once handguns are regis-
tered, the next step in the gun control regime would be
handgun confiscation.
Even with significant compliance by handgun owners, the
Brady II registration system would take decades to mature into a
comprehensive system. During that period, the license re-
quirement would be difficult to enforce since it relies heavily on
an efficient registration system. If significant compliance could
not be achieved, the whole idea seems dubious. The result
could be a bureaucratic apparatus collecting paper, but to no
constructive end, much like how the system in Massachusetts
operates.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there are two competing visions of handgun
control for the United States-(1) prohibition and (2) compre-
hensive licensing and registration. These plans tend to be de-
bated in the abstract, as slogans, and in principle. Surprisingly
little work has been done on the mechanics and feasibility of ei-
ther plan. Now, Handgun Control, Inc. and its congressional al-
lies have offered a fully elaborated proposal for comprehensive
handgun licensing and registration. The existence of this pro-
posal enables a much more sophisticated debate than previously
possible.
Printz is a major blow to any further national gun control
regulatory initiatives. Apparently, the Commerce Clause power,
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which justified the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Brady
Handgun Control Act of 1993 cannot serve as the justification
for any federal plan that, like Brady II, mandates administration
and enforcement by state and local officials. The best option, at
least in our view, is a federally-run nationwide handgun control
apparatus. But any such proposal would have to surmount lo-
gistical hurdles.
Comprehensive licensing and registration would be difficult
to administer and enforce. One major problem is the existence
of eighty to ninety million handguns currently owned by 26% of
American households. Getting these people licensed and their
handguns registered would be a monumental task, not only due
to the number of handguns, but to the strong (some would say
intractable) "gun culture" in the United States. Evasion would
be easy and the costs of enforcement would be high. The
emergence of a resistance movement would entail significant
social and political costs for the nation.
The primary purpose of gun control is to prevent gun vio-
lence by criminals and other irresponsible individuals. Unfor-
tunately, criminals will be the most difficult group to bring into
compliance with any system of licensing and registration.
Criminals (at least those with a felony indictment or conviction
or misdemeanor domestic violence conviction) are already vio-
lating federal and state law by owning or possessing a handgun.
More laws are unlikely to prevent most criminals from obtaining
guns.
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